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Brexit and the future of EU-Russia relations
It is hard to imagine the EU without Britain. It is even harder to 
make accurate predictions for what comes after an unprecedent-
ed event. Brexit, if and when it happens, will deliver a blow of his-
torical proportions to European ambitions for deeper integration; 
its implications for the EU will be far-reaching and overwhelm-
ingly difficult to foresee. Therefore, any attempt for long-term cal-
culations, economic or otherwise, should be taken with a pinch 
of salt. Nevertheless, there are a few institutional features of a 
Britain-less EU that could already be considered. For instance, it 
is safe to assume that the 2019 elections for the European Par-
liament (EP) will not take place in the UK and hence the next EU 
legislature will not contain any British Members of Parliament 
(MEPs). 
Expect the absence of 73 MEPs from the UK and across the politi-
cal spectrum to upset the dynamics in the European Parliament1. 
The groups of the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Social-
ists & Democrats (S&D), along with the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats (ALDE), will be required to reach a new compromise 
between them that will outline the mainstream, pro-European 
bloc in the EP. Nevertheless, the likely breakdown of the Europe-
an Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy (EFDD) – led by British Conservatives and 
UKIP respectively – will affect even more profoundly the equilib-
rium in the far-right end of the EP. 
The far-right shifting gears in the European Parliament is of 
special importance for EU-Russia relations because of the well-
documented link between right-wing populist parties and Putin’s 
Russia. At this time, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders’ Europe of 
Nations and Freedom (ENF) look likely to gain momentum be-
cause of the Brexit vote. Rejoicing in the wake of the results in 
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the UK, both of them have called for EU referenda in France and 
in the Netherlands2. This Policy Brief will attempt to assess to 
what extent the changing landscape of the European far-right 
after Brexit may prompt the consolidation of pro-Russia forces 
in the European Parliament and what this could mean for Rus-
sian information warfare as well as the general course of EU-
Russia relations.
A consensus is emerging in the transatlantic 
community that the Kremlin’s manipulation of 
information constitutes a real threat to EU se-
curity. Across Europe, far-right, populist and Eu-
ro-skeptic political parties are embracing Rus-
sia’s information campaigns. In the European 
Parliament, Marine Le Pen’s Europe of Nations 
and Freedom (ENF) is the main proponent of 
pro-Kremlin narratives. The foreign policy plat-
form of the Front National in France contains 
explicit references to a strategic alliance with 
the Kremlin and a pan-European Union that in-
cludes Russia. Following Brexit, Marine Le Pen 
is describing the UK vote as a peoples’ rebel-
lion that has signaled the beginning of the 
end for the EU, much like the fall of the Berlin 
Wall signaled the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Conceivably, in the aftermath of Brexit the ab-
sence of British Eurosceptic MEPs from the Eu-
ropean Parliament may lead to the consolida-
tion of the radical far-right under the banner of 
the Front National. In turn, this means that the 
EU may have a rather difficult time gathering 
the necessary support to confront Russian as-
sertiveness in the Eastern Neighbourhood.
2Russian information warfare and the European far-right
A series of relevant publications and parliamentary hearings3 
indicates an emerging consensus in foreign policy circles 
across the Atlantic that the Kremlin’s manipulation of informa-
tion constitutes a threat to security, one that exploits the open-
ness of western liberal democracies and puts the national se-
curity of EU and NATO members at risk. 
The information warfare of Putin’s Russia is designed to ma-
nipulate or confuse public opinion with intentionally false ma-
terial, which is spread through the use of social media (includ-
ing trolling) and a network of state-sponsored media outlets4. 
However, Russian information warfare is far more sophisticat-
ed than a mere ensemble of trolling farms, viral hoaxes and 
paranoid conspiracy theories. It is driven by a set of refined 
and complex historical narratives: some even claim that Pu-
tin is revolutionising information warfare by using skewed in-
terpretations of the past and deploying history as a political 
weapon5. What is more, the Russian information strategy is 
highly segmented and region-specific6, which makes it difficult 
– if not impossible – to come up with a uniform response to 
Putin’s tactics. 
Across Europe, Putin’s segmented message is mostly carried 
by the far-right. This is not a big surprise.  For some time, far-
right populists have been aligning themselves with Moscow7. 
In Central Europe, the Hungarian far-right Jobbik relays Rus-
sian geopolitical visions of ‘Eurasianism’8. Northward in Slo-
vakia, a multifarious far-right resonates with skewed reinven-
tions of both ‘Eurasianism’ and ‘Pan-Slavism’9. Further to the 
South, in Greece, where Russia toppled the EU in nationwide 
approval ratings10, the Kremlin is of course exploiting domes-
tic disappointment over European economic governance, but 
it also plays with twisted notions of patriotism, religious zeal 
and apocalyptic prophesies11. However, the notable increase 
of the Kremlin’s influence in Europe is not confined to the East 
and the South, where Russia is perceived as a natural ally be-
cause of cultural and religious heritage. Marine Le Pen’s Front 
National (FN) and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) – 
the political group that she leads in the European Parliament 
– is an exceptional case of Russian influence that is consoli-
dating its presence in western Europe.
Anti-American and pro-Kremlin narratives in the FN’s 
‘Politique Etrangère’
In terms of pro-Russian narratives and the spread of disinfor-
mation, Marine Le Pen’s FN is operating within the same dis-
course followed by far-right parties across Europe. One of the 
major themes is that US economic and security interests are 
dominating Europe. For the French far-right, the entire transat-
lantic security architecture represents an organised attempt 
to subdue the nations of Europe and strip them of their na-
tional sovereignty. This kind of anti-Americanism is an explicit 
component of the FN’s foreign policy platform. According to 
the FN’s ‘Politique Etrangère’, French leaders in the past have 
been ‘prisoners’ of an ‘internationalist ideology’, which is ‘uni-
versally enforced’ by the ‘western American model’; French 
governments have ‘aligned France with the United States’ and 
by so doing they have sacrificed national sovereignty only to 
‘dissolve into a European Empire, deprived of identity’12. 
On the opposite side of this argument lies the image of Rus-
sia as a strategic ally for Europe. The foreign policy positions 
of the FN are unequivocal to this end. Instead of unprovoked 
hostility, the ideal Europe for the FN should be offering Russia 
a ‘strategic alliance’ in military terms and in specific policies 
such as energy. The ultimate goal of this alliance would then 
be the formation of a ‘pan-European union of sovereign na-
tions’ that will include Russia (and Switzerland)13. This stark 
contrast between the US plotting against national sovereignty 
and Russia as potentially enabling European emancipation is 
the canvas upon which the rest of the pro-Russia narratives 
are sketched; and it looks like the Brexit vote is breathing new 
life into those narratives.
When the result of the UK referendum was in, Alexey Push-
kov, Head of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, rejoiced 
on Twitter by describing Brexit as a ‘revolt against the ruling 
system and traditional politicians’14. On June 27, Yulia Lat-
ynina, commentator for the Russian Novaya Gazeta, portrayed 
Brexit as ‘an uprising against Brussels’ and likened the EU to 
‘an enormous socialist state’ just like the Soviet Union15. The 
next day, in an op-ed published in the New York Times (in both 
English and French), Marine Le Pen summoned once again the 
image of the EU as a ‘prison’ and a ‘cage’, citing this time Brexit 
as an act of revolt and the beginning of the ‘inevitable peoples’ 
spring’. More and more, Le Pen wrote, ‘the destiny of the Euro-
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pean Union resembles the destiny of the Soviet Union, which 
died from its own contradictions16. Elsewhere, in an interview 
with Time Magazine, Le Pen compared the result of the UK 
referendum with the fall of the Berlin Wall, invoking again the 
image of the collapsing Soviet Union17. This comparison be-
tween the EU and the Soviet Union is an opportune and novel 
tactic. Its function is to update the threadbare argument that 
western democracy is morally corrupt, and that integration 
with Europe since the Cold War has failed, in order to instill on 
the public a sense of the EU’s imminent collapse18.
Couple this alarmist, Eurosceptic, rhetoric with the well-proven 
fact that the FN received funding from Kremlin-backed finan-
cial institutions19  and Le Pen’s vocal pro-Russian stance might 
seem as a foregone conclusion. Le Pen herself confirmed the 
loan and did not shy away from admitting she was going to 
ask for more Russian money with which to fund her upcoming 
presidential campaign20. Yet the pro-Russian approach of the 
FN hardly stops there: allegedly, key members of the French 
party develop and maintain pro-Kremlin networks of influence 
and a complete media world ripe with Russian propaganda 
and disinformation material21.
Will the ENF lead a far-right bloc in the European Parlia-
ment after Brexit?
The same pro-Russian themes and pieces of disinformation 
have been echoing in the chambers of the European Parlia-
ment, where the FN is currently leading Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF), a coalition of far-right parties that includes 
four of the most influential far-right parties in Europe: the 
Dutch PVV (led by Geert Wilders), the Lega Nord from Italy, the 
Austrian FPO and the Flemish Vlaams Belang. Even before the 
establishment of the ENF last November, MEPs belonging to 
the FN and its allies were fierce opponents of US interference 
in European matters and outspoken advocates for Europe’s 
strategic alliance with Russia. A recurring group of MEPs ac-
tive in the Committee on Foreign Affairs (including the French 
Aymeric Chauprade who has been considered in the past as a 
conspiracy theorist and a 9/11 denier22) has been disseminat-
ing pieces of Russian disinformation relating to the destruc-
tion of the MH17 flight, the EU’s alleged support of Nazis in 
Ukraine and the citing of NATO aggression as the trigger of 
Russian retaliation in Crimea23.
Evidently, compared to the ECR and the EFDD, led by British 
Conservatives and UKIP respectively, Marine Le Pen’s ENF 
represents a far more radical Euroscepticism. In the past, the 
unwillingness of UKIP to cooperate with FN has made it very 
difficult for Le Pen to reach the threshold of 25 MEPs from 
7 Member-States and form a political group in the European 
Parliament24. The absence of British MEPs in the next EU legis-
lature will probably mean that the ENF will have an easier time 
reaching this threshold. And, for now, it is doubtful whether 
either the Polish Conservatives or Beppe Grillo’s Cinque Stelle 
(junior partners in ECR and EFDD respectively) will be able to 
stand on their own or to find common ground and challenge 
Le Pen’s momentum. It seems more likely that Le Pen will as-
sume the leadership of a broader far-right bloc in the European 
Parliament after Brexit. 
The strengthening of the radical, far-right, bloc may be Brexit’s 
unfortunate repercussion in the European Parliament. Not 
only in terms of the increased access in EU funds that Le Pen 
will enjoy, but also in terms of the increased legitimacy that 
the far-right, pro-Kremlin, narratives will seek to attain inside 
the EU’s legislative chamber. A rather common hypothesis in 
the Brexit debate is that the loss of the UK’s soft and hard pow-
er will result in diminished international influence for the EU. 
The far-right’s shifting gears in the European Parliament might 
just prove this hypothesis – in which case, it is not impossible 
to imagine that the EU will have an even more difficult time 
justifying a policy of confrontation with Russia in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood.
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